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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
\YHITNEY PARRY, 
Pla·intiff amd Appellant, 
vs. 
J. H. CROSBY, as Justice of the 
Peace of Kanab Precinct, Kane 
County, State of Utah, GEORGE 
A. SwAPP, as Sheriff of Kane 
County, State of Utah, and 
DAVID L. PuGH, as County At-
torney of Kane County, State 
of Utah, 
Defendarnts and Respondents. 
No. 6225 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
'nhls :appeal involves the constrUJC1tion of Section 
103-25-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pertaining to 
the seizure and destruction of alleged gambling pa-ra-
phernalia. The paraphernalia involved consists of so-
ealled ''slot ma;chines. '' 'The seizure and threatened 
destruction ·o.f the machines and confiscation of money 
contained therein is attacked primarily on the ground 
that the seizure was without due process of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
On June 12, 19·39 four so-called slot machines were 
taken from the possession of appellant at the Parry 
Lodge in Kanab, Uta·h. At the time ·of the seizure of the 
machines, respondent sheriff had initiated proceedings 
in the Justice's Court, Kanab Precinct, Kane County 
wherein the State of Utah appeared as plaintiff and 
Whitney Parry, the appellant, was named as defendant. 
The proceedings were commenced by the filing ·Of an af-
fidavit for atta1chment signed by the sheriff and in which 
affidavit he deposed "That he has reason to !believe and 
does believe that the said Whitney Parry has in his place 
of business certain Slot Machines which are being oper-
ated contrary to law." (Abs. p. 10; Tr. pp. 16-17) Upon 
this affidavit the respondent Justice of the Peace issued 
a writ ·Of attacJhment commanding the sheriff ''to attach 
and safely keep any and all Slot Machines belonging to 
the above named defendant (Parry) which may be found 
in his place of business, known as the Parry Lodge ·in 
Kanab, Kane County, State of Utah, until disposed of 
by order of Court." (Abs. p. 11; Tr. p. 17). On the same 
day, the respondent sheriff made his return on the writ 
that he had attached ''four slot macJhines and that he was 
holding the same to be disposed o.f by order of court.'' 
(Abs. p. 12; Tr. pp. 17-18) 
On the 7th day of July, 1939 respondent Justice of 
the Pea·ce issued a " 1Citation to Show Cause" in the ease 
entitled in his court____;The State of Utah, plaintiff, vs. 
Whitney Parry, defendant,-requiring Parry to show 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
cause, if any he had, why the slot machines, which were 
taken from him under writ ·O.f attachment issued by the 
court, should not be destroyed and the money in them 
forfeited to Kane County. (Abs. pp. 12-13; Tr. p. 18) 
On the 26th day of July, 1939 and before any hearing 
on the Citation to Show Cause, appellant filed in the Dis-
trict Co-urt of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Kane 
County, State of lTtah his complaint against the respond-
ents praying for injunctive relief. (Aihs. pp. 1-5; Tr. pp. 
1-5) A temporary restraining order was issued by the 
District Court (Abs. pp. 5 .. 6; Tr. p. 5) and the matter 
came on for hearing upon an order to show cause (Abs. 
pp. 6-7; Tr. p. 9) ·On the 15th day of August, 19·39; the 
issues being joined by an answer filed on behalf of the 
respondents. ( Abs. pp. 7-8 ; Tr. p. 11) 
The gist of appellant's complaint in the District 
Court was that the devices taken by respondents were 
taken without due process of law or any legal proceeding 
whatsoever and that the respondents threatened to de-
stroy the devices and to confiscate money of undeter-
mined amount to appellant's detriment. The answer ad-
mits the seizure of the four devices containing money 
but alleges that the devices were taken by due process of 
la.w '• and that said devices were gambling devi·ces and 
were being operated by the said plaintiff and his agents 
contrary to law.'' 
At the trial of the injunction suit Mr. Parry testified 
that he was at the Parry Lodge on the night of June 12tih 
when the machines involved were taken by the sheriff 
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but that he was not served with any papers. (Abs. pp. 
21-22; Tr. p. 38) At this time the Parry Lodge was de-
finitely dosed to the public. A motion picture company 
1had taken under lease all of the aocommoda.tions and 
there was a sign on the front of the lodge to the effect 
that the plajce was closed. The lodge was being operated 
as a. private home would ibe under lease. (Abs. p. 22; Tr. 
p. 29) Appellant testified, on cross examination, as t·o 
a conversation with the sheriff on the night that the ma-
chines were taken. He testified that the sheriff said, 
"We have come to get your slot maehines." The appel-
lant said, ''By what authority are you taking· these slot 
machines~'' To which the sheriff replied, '' \Ye have a 
paper made out by the County Attorne~· and signed by 
~~··, 
the Justice of the Peace." (Abs. p. 23; Tr. p. 43) 
T!he record is silent as to the use of the machines 
on June 12th or at any other time except that it was 
stipulated, subject to the objeetion that such testimony 
would be irrelevant and immaterial, that a Mr. Luke, 
a road patrolman, 'if called on the part of the defendants, 
would testify that a day or so before the ma-chines in-
volved were picked up that he saw the mruchines being 
played "in tJhe ordinary way" at the Parry Lodg·e. (Abs. 
p. 25; Tr. pp. 30, 35, 45) 
The court thereafter ~made and entered its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (Abs. pp. 
8-17; Tr. pp. 15-22) dis·solving, vacating and setting aside 
the temporary restraining order theretofore issued and 
dismissing appellant's action with costs to the respond-
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ents. It is from that judgment that this appeal is pro-
seeuted. 
STATEMEN'l'S OF ERRORS RE-LIED UPON. 
Ten a:Ssignments of error are urged. Cmnmon to all 
of the assignments is the contention that the proceeding· 
in the Justice's 0ourt should have been a proceeding i11 
rem rath-er than a proceeding in personam to accomplish 
what the respondents apparently intended to accomplish; 
i.e., the destruction of the so-called slot machines and the 
confiscation of the money in them. 
The first assignment go·es to the testimony of the 
witness Luke. Luke's testimony that ''a day or so'' be-
fore the machines were picked up he saw t:hem being 
played "in the ordinary way" in the Parry Lodge could 
only be relevant and material to justify the respondents 
in taking some action in a proceeding in personam. The 
proceeding in the Justice's 0ourt being not bas·ed upon 
any crime allegedly committed by Parry, the testimony 
was obviously irrelevant and immaterial as justification 
for the seizure. 
Assignments 2 and 3 attack the trial court's rulings 
in admitting in ·evidence respondents' Exhilbits "A'' and 
'·'B"-Exhibit "A" was the Affidavit for Attachment 
and Exhibit "B" the Writ of Attachment-both entitled 
in the Justi.ce's court with the State of Utah as plaintiff 
and Whitney Parry as defendant. These exhibits were 
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objected to· upon the ground that they were incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial and that no proper foundation 
had been laid for their admission, the theory of the re-
spondents being that the exhibits justified or went to 
justify the seizure of the machines. 
Assignment No. 4 is self-explanatory. By this as-
signment appellant challenges the pr·opriety of the trial 
court's refusal to strike a portion of an answer of re-
spondents' witness Chamberlain. The motion was made 
on the ground that the portion of the answer referred 
to was indefinite, vague, conjectural and otherwise incom-
petent. When the witness said that the sheriff "ap-
parently" offered Exhibit "B'' to appellant or offered 
it to him to read, the witness stated nothing but a con-
clusion. His testimony did not rise to the dignity of a 
sta:tem·ent of fa-ct. 
Assignments 5, 6 and 7 g~n to speei:fi.c findings or por-
tions of findings of fact adopted by the trial court and 
are complained of on the ground that the portions in-
dicated are not supported by but are contrary to the 
evidence. 
Assignments 8 and 9 are directed to· t~he conclusions 
of law drawn by the trial court from the findings of fa.ct 
and assignm-ent No. 10 attacks the judgment on the 
ground that it is contrary to law and that the evidenee 
is insufficient to sustain or justify the same in the parti-
culars indicated by the assignment. 
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STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR 
QUES.TIONS INVOLVEU. 
vV as the proceeding in the J ustiee 's court sufficient 
to give that court jurisdicti·on to seiz·e or to· order de-
struction of the so ... c.alled slot machines and the forfeiture 
of the money contained in then1 to l(ane County' 
ARGUMENT. 
This court in the case of Utah Liquor Control Com-
mission v. Wooras, (Utah) 93 Pac. (2d) 455, has reiter-
ated many of the fundamental principles involved in this 
appeal. The decision in the W ooras case constitutes a 
terse, comprehensive and clear restatement of what con-
stitutes due pr•ocess of law in aetions in personam as 
well as in aetions in rem. 
In the W ooras case two questions were presented 
for determination. '' 1. Were the issues raised by the 
pleadings such as to make relevant and material certain 
testimony eXJcluded by the ·Court' 2. Were the pleadings 
and the proceedings lhy which the property was seized 
sufficient to vest the .court with power to order a con-
fiscation of the property'" The statute under which the 
Liquor Commission proceeded in the W oora.s case was 
different in a number ·o.f particulars from the statute in-
volv·ed in this .case but the fundamental principles are 
the same. 
In the ·case at bar, the respondents sought to invoke 
the right of seizure of property and its destruction in 
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an action in pers-onam and not in rem. The affidavit of 
the sheriff, the initial proceeding .in the Justice's 1court, 
was not sufficient for any purpose. It was not a com-
plaint, a petition or an affidavit charging Parry with the 
com·mission of a crime. Section 103-2:5-7, Revised Stat-
utes of Utah, 1933, makes it a misdemeanor for a person 
to keep or operate in :his place of business the device or 
instrument enmmonly known as a ''slot machine'' for 
gambling. There is no averment in the affidavit made 
by the sheriff ·that Parry kept such a device or machine 
''for gambling.'' But in any event the other papers 
signed, prepared and acted up-on by respondents indicate, 
not the purpose to charge Parry with the commission 
of a crime, but to obtain an order ·of destruction of prop-
erty and which proceeding is ·essentially one in rem. We 
quote from the W ooras case as follows: 
''In libel actions f.or ·confiscation, where the 
proceeding is essentially against the property as 
such, the res itself must be brought before the 
court by and through such process as the law has 
decreed to place it within the power and control 
of the court. ' ' 
If the respondents were attempting to act within the 
purview of Secti·on 103.-25-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, the affidavit of ·the sheriff was wholly insufficient 
as legal process not only beeause the affidavit referred 
to Parry as an individual but also in that it lacked the 
averment upon which such a seizure could be predicated. 
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So far as is rna terial to the issues herein involved, the 
section reads : 
'' * * * it shall be the, duty of all '" * 
peaee officers whenever it shall .come to the 
knowledge of such offieer that any person has in 
his possession any * * '" slot machines * 
* * used or kept for the purpose of playing for 
money, or for tokens redeemable in money * * 
* or that * "' * slot machines * '" * 
used or kept for the purpose aforesaid Inay be 
found in anr place, to seize and take such * * 
* slot machines and convey the same bef.oTe a 
magistrate of the co·unty in whic,h such devices 
shall be found; * * * '' 
There is nothing in the affidavit, respondents' Ex-
hibit "A'', which indicates that the offending slot ma-
chines were used or kept for the purpose of playing for 
money or for tokens redeemable in money and it is upon 
that ground only that the machines, if properly proceeded 
against, can be seized. 
The respondents in the Justice's court, whether the 
action be termed one in personam or in rem, apparently 
proceeded ·on the theory that a so-called slot machine, 
regardless of its use, was contraband and subject to 
seizure. In the W ooras case, supra, Justice Pratt in his 
eoncurring decision stated: 
''I ·Concur but wish to add this : If the prop-
erty seized has but ·one use and that an illegal one, 
no one may claim it, as no one has a property right 
in an illegal thing-under such circumstances the 
invalidity .of the process of seizure is immaterial. 
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If any of the property seized in this case is of that 
class, then it should not be returned.'' 
There is nothing in the ,case at bar to indicate that 
the ma,chines seized by respondents had but one use, to-
wit, an illegal use and there is nothing in the record to. 
indicate that the ·machines, if used for any purpose, were 
''used or kept for the purpose of playing for money, or 
for tokens redeemable in money.'' Respondents in their 
pro-ceeding in the Justice's court apparently took the 
position that a slot machine described as such, lby name 
only, and regardless of its use was per se an illegal thing 
in which there was no property right-such is not the 
law. 
The case of Lee v. City of Mia,mi, 163 So. 486 
( 1Florida), is a case that is extensively annotated on the 
particular subj.ect as to whether ·or not a slot machine is 
per se contraband in 101 A. L. R. 112.6. The first head-
note of the A. L. R. on page 1115 is as follows: 
"Ooin-operated vending machines Virith prem-
ium features which may or may not vend for 
ea;ch ·coin deposited an article of merchandis·e, 
coin-operated skill machines which may or may 
not pay a reward for skillful operation, and trade 
machines giving to patrons at intervals the right 
to receive premiums, are not lotteries per se, so 
that a statute licensing and regulating the same 
does not conflict Virith a constitutional provision 
prohibiting lotteries.'' 
By reason of the comprehensive annotation on the 
general sulbjHct, we have refrained from picking out in-
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dividual or isolated cases. The annotation itself will 
give the court a lead to many appropriate cases without 
reiteration on our part. 
Where a thing can be used for a purpos·e other th·an 
an illegal one, it must ·be proceeded against with the same 
formality and subject to the same due process of law 
as in the case ·of individuals. This ·elemental proposition 
is very ably stated by this court in the Woora.s case, 
speaking through J ustiee Larson: 
'' The jurisdiction of the courts to condemn or 
forfeit property is dependent upon statute, and 
the prescribed procedure is in general regarded 
as e~elusive and in a sense jurisdictional. United 
States v. Franzione, 286 F. 769, 52 App. D. C. 307. 
All these proceedings are ·Civil in their nature, and 
the res is proceeded against as a thing guilty, and 
is a party to the action. Other parties asserting 
an interest in the property which they wish to de-
fend, may come into the a.ction, s·et up their rights 
and have them determined.'' 
In the case at bar and in a proceeding against the 
machines, they are the guilty thing; it was not sufficient 
to merely describe the machines as slot machines bu:t it 
was necessary for them to allege they were ''used or 
kept for the purpose of playing f.or money, or for tokens 
redeemable in money.'' 
That this averment by complaint, petition or af-
fidavit is essential becomes even mor·e clear when con-
sidering the last portion of ·Section 103-25-1 where it is 
declared that ''if such magistrate shall determine that 
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the same are used or kept f.or the purpose o.f being used 
at any game or games of :chance des.cribed in this chapter, 
it shall be his duty to destroy the same." In other words, 
the magistrate cannot order a confis·cation of the prop-
erty unless he finds that the property was used or kept 
f.or the purpose of being used as a game of .chance. By 
the mere use ·Of the generic term "slot machines" no 
court, sheriff, county attorney is ·entitled to seize the 
machines ·without attaching to them the element of 
gambling; without that averment the thing proceeded 
against is guilty of no crime. The element of gambling 
must he present to. charge an individual with a crime 
under Chapter 25 of Title 103, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, and when paraphernalia is sought to be seized and 
destroyed it must be shown that not only the element of 
gambling exists but also that the machine or parapiher-
nalia itself was us·ed or kept for the purpose o.f playing 
f.or money or for tokens redeemable in money. 
For the reasons stated, the evidence sought to be 
excluded and the t.estim·ony sought to be stricken was ir-
relevant and immaterial. 
In the W ooras case it is said: 
''It is elemental that before a court can law-
fully determine any rights it must not only be_ a 
court empowered by law to determine such rights, 
but it must have acquired jurisdiction or control 
over the subject of the parUcular action, and of 
the parties thereto, by and in the methods recog-
nized or prescribed by law. It acquires its juris-
diction of the plaintiff when he ·comes into court 
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iJn~oking· its action. It a.cquires jurisdiction of 
the subject of the particular aetion by the filing 
of t;he sufficient complaint ·Or other proper plead-
ing or petition. And it acquires jurisdiction of 
the defendant or party other than plaintiff by the 
lawful servir·e upon it of proper legal process or 
by its voluntary appearance in the action and 
submissi·on to the court's jurisdiction over it.'' 
In the case at bar all fundmnentals of procedure 
were ignored by the respondents. The .statements of 
this court in the \V.ooras ease are not statements o.f newly 
discovered principles but are of basic reiterations and 
fundamental propositions in a most erudite and concise 
manner. The law as it now stands s:hould, in our opinion, 
resolve the issues in fav.or of the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARLEY W. GusTIN, 
Attonz,ey for Plaintiff 
atnd Appellant. 
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